Development of a new screening table for Sea/Air Mariners. by Scott, Dwight F.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
1985
Development of a new screening table for Sea/Air Mariners.
Scott, Dwight F.




















Thesis Advisor: R. A. Zimmerman
Approved for public release, distribution unlimited.
1226837

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (Whtn Dmtm Enfrmd)
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE READ INSTRUCTIONSBEFORE COMPLETING FORM
I. REPORT NUMBER 2. GOVT ACCESSION NO 3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (and Subtitle) 5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED
Development of a New Screening Table
For Sea/Air Mariners
Master's Thesis
6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
7. AUTHORCs; 8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBERCaJ
Dwight F. Scott
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 939^3-5100
10. PROGRAM ELEMENT. PROJECT, TASK
AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS






U. MONITORING AGENCY NAME 4 AODRESSC// d///ersnf Irom Controlling Olllcu) IS. SECURITY CLASS, (ot thia report)
15«. DECLASSIFICATION/ DOWNGRADING
SCHEDULE
16. DISTRIBUTION ST ATEMEN T ("o^ f/i* s Repori;
Approved for public release, distribution unlimited.
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered In Block 30, It dUlerent Irom Report)
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
19- KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse aide 11 necessary and Identify by block number)
Sea/Air Mariner Program, Naval Reserve, i-'Iilitary Reserve,
Personnel Attrition, Recruiting Standards, Military Personnel
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse aide If necessary and Identify by block ^umbar)
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the attrition bv havior
of the first accessions, fiscal year 193^ accessions, into the
Sea/Air Mariner (S/iM) program and develop an improved screening
table for SAM applicants. Data files of active Navy, Ready
Mariner, and SAI! personnel were used as the basis for applying
statistical methods to develop an improved screening table.
DD 1 JAN 73 1473 EDITION OF I NOV 65 IS OBSOLETE
5 N 0102- LF- 014- 6601 SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Bnlarad)
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited,





Commander, United^ States Navy
B.A.A. , Auburn University, 1968
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of





The purpose o-f this thesis is to examine the attrition
behavior o-f the first accessions, -fiscal year 1984 acces-
sions, into the Sea/Air Mariner (SAM) program and develop an
improved screening table -for SAM applicants. Data -files o-f
active Navy, Ready Mariner, and SAM personnel were used as





A. ACTIVE NAVY 12
B. NAVAL RESERVES 13
1. History 13
2. Force Composition ..... 22
3. Present Missions 26
4. NeM Missions 27
5. Sea/Air Mariner Program 28
III. LITERATURE REVIEW 32
A. TOTAL FORCE CONCEPT 32
B. COST OF RESERVE PROGRAMS 34
C. FACTORS AFFECTING RESERVE PARTICIPATION ... 36
D. SCREENING 42
IV. ANALYSIS 46
A. DATA FILES 46
1. Active Navy 46
2. Ready Mariner 47
3. Sea/Air Mariner 47
B. VARIABLES 48
C. METHODOLOGY 49
V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 50
A. DATA BASE SELECTION 50
B- SAM SCREENING TABLE 60
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 64
A. CONCLUSIONS . 64
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 66
LIST OF REFERENCES 68
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 72
LIST OF TABLES
I. DEMOGRAPHIC COMPARISONS OF FYa4 NAVAL
RECRUITS 51
2- BIVARIATE RELATIONSHIPS 51
3. SAM DATA DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE 53
4. CHI -SQUARE ANALYSIS OF MAIN EFFECTS FOR
THE SAM MODEL 55
5. LOGISTIC REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS FOR THE
SAM MODEL 55
6. CHI -SQUARE ANALYSIS OF MAIN EFFECTS FOR
THE ACTIVE NAVY MODEL 56
7. LOGISTIC REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS FOR THE
ACTIVE NAVY MODEL 56
a. CROSSTABULATION OF PREDICTED vs ACTUAL
ATTRITION FDR VARIOUS CUT SCORES 58
9. CHI -SQUARE ANALYSIS OF THE SAM SCREEN
MODEL MAIN EFFECTS 61
10. LOGISTIC REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS FOR THE
SAM SCREEN MODEL . 61
II. SAM SCREEN TABLE 62
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1978—79, a -flag study group chaired by Mary Snavely
Dickson, the Deputy Assistant Secretary o-f the Navy -for
Manpower, attempted to identify current manning needs and
predict -furture manning requirements. The outcome, the Navy
Manpower Mobilization System (NAMMOS) , was implemented in
1979. NAMMOS is currently a macro—or i ented , computer-based
system -for estimating mobilization requirements by time
intervals. This is usually stated in terms o-f the number of
personnel required per month for mobilization. CRef. ID
NAMMOS has indicated a shortage of El—E4 rated personnel
in the Naval Selected Reserves (SELRES) . The majority of
personnel entering the SELRES have had three to four years
of active duty or prior serivce (PS) and generally 3ir& E-
4s, soon to be eligible for E—5. A new program initiated in
fiscal year 1984, the Sea/Air Mariner (SAM) program, enlists
10,000 non—prior-service (NFS) personnel annually, with a
maximum of 12 months active duty for training before joining
a SELRES unit. The SAM program is targeted to the E1-E4
shortages identified by previous NAMMOS results.
SAMs entering the SELRES aire sent to full—time training
to qualify them for their assigned rating. This training
ranges from a minimum of four months for low—aptitude skills
to more than ten months for higher-aptitude skills. The cost
o-f training NPS personnel varies by skill, but simple cost
estimates that include recruiting cost, training cost, and
military pay during training range -from ^12,000 to more than
$35,000- CRe-f. 23 The return -from this training investment
comes as individuals serve their term o-F service and are
available for mobilization. For the SELRES, almost all NPS
enlistees enlist for six years. Of course, selected reser-
vists work only part—time and aire usually required to work
on the reserve job 38 days per year (14 days of annual
training and 24 days of drill). A typical NPS reservist who
enlists for six years and serves a complete term would serve
for 223 days. However, the return from training for a
reservist can not be measured strictly by days served, since
the reservist is liable for full-time duty at any time
during the six year period.
There &re several measures to use to judge whether or
not a SELRES is successful. Some of the more commonly
accepted measures of determining success aret
1. attrition
2. performance on the job (skills test and
evaluation by seniors)
3. legal infractions or lack thereof
4. trainability
5. team participation and interaction.
This thesis focuses on the first of these factors, attri-
tion, and in particular, attrition from the SAM program.
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The term attrition is not clearly de-fined. Webster's
de-finition o-f attrition is, "a wearing down or reduction,
chie-fly as a result o-f resignation, retirement or death,"
CRe-f. 3D but the interpretations o-f that de-finition vary
from service to service. The de-finition o-f-fered by DOD
Directive #1315.7 re-fers to attrition as "separation prior
to completion o-f the contractual active duty obligation."
All the military services currently lose approximately 30
percent o-f each entering cohort be-fore the completion o-f
contractual obligations. The largest loss rate occurs during
the first six months, when over 10 percent of the entering
cohort is discharged. Since this time frame coincides with
the approximate time SAMs spend on active duty, SAM success
will be determined by six month attrition rates. CRef. 4j
A current topic in any government agency is the budget
deficit. There is enormous pressure from Congress, the
public, and the Executive Branch to reduce cost. Obviously,
one means of meeting manpower requirements at a reduced cost
is to reduce replacement costs resulting from premature
attrition of first term personnel
-
Beyond the direct budget costs associated with high
attrition, indirect, but real, cost in the form of an addi-
tional "failure experience for young people in the form of
negative attitudes held by prior service personnel must not
be overlooked. Negative and credible information about mili-
tary service experiences among large numbers of prior
service personnel can only make recruiting and advertising
e-f -forts much more difficult.
The inception of the All Volunteer Force (AVF) in 1973
provided Navy manpower planners with the challenge of
attracting, recruiting and retaining high quality personnel
in the absence of conscription. Navy manpower planners must
also cope with a decreasing supply of 18—21 year olds. In
fact, this cohort is predicted to shrink by approximately 15
percent by 198S when compared to the 1979 cohort, and by
approximately 25 percent by 1994. CRef. 51
In fiscal year 19S3, the ability of Navy recruiters to
meet their recruiting goals was enhanced by the unfavorable
economic conditions at the time. The trends referred to
above, however, indicate that such ease in manning the force
will not prevail throughout this decade. As of March 19S5,
Navy recruiting as a whole is 15 percent short of its goal
CRef. 63, this deficiency may continue so long as the
economy stays healthy and there is no major international
discord. The Navy SELRES may be forced to recruit "less
qualified" personnel just to meet manning requirements.
The foregoing discussion suggests that more accurate and
cost effective screening will be necessary to meet manning
requirements. Presently, the SAM program applicants Are
screened using the same screening table as active duty
applicants. This table has remained unchanged since 1977.
CRef. 71 Lockman and Lurie of the Center of Naval Analysis
(CNA) , have laid the foundation for this thesis in a series
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o-f studies concerning -first term attrition. CRef. 7,83 The
objective o-f this thesis is to develop a more accurate and
cost e-f-fective screening table for the SAM program.
This thesis will provide the reader with a background to
better understand the problem o-f attrition, especically
reserve attrition. This is accomplished through a presenta-
tion o-f Naval Reserve history, followed by a discussion o-f
current literature on the subject. The analysis section
includes a discussion o-f the data base, variables, and meth-
odology used to develop the new SAM screening table. The
empirical results section presents -findings as they relate
to screening o-f recruits. The conclusion summarizes the





The Naval Reserve a^re under the authority o-f the regular
Navy. Thus, in order to give proper perspective to a discus-
sion o-f the Reserves, it is necessary to brie-fly discuss the
development and organization o-f the active Navy.
The original Department o-f the Navy was established in
1778. It was similar to the Revolutionary Navy in that it
was in the hands o-f civilian appointees. Naval o-fficers
were appointed to provide pro-f essional assistance to the
civilian appointees. This assistance took the -form o-f advice
relating to the construction, repair, and equipping o-f ships
and the managing o-f shipyards. By 1842, the Navy Department
had shifted -from being primarily a manpower intensive ser-
vice, like the Army, to a material intensive service, deeply
involved in complex and expanding technical problems. Also,
five individual bureaus under the Secretary o-f the Navy had
been created. The weakness o-f this bureau system was recog-
nized during the Civil War, and led to the creation o-f
additional bureaus. CRe-f. 9!]
During the closing years of the 19th century, it became
increasingly difficult for the Secretary to personnally
coordinate the activities of the Department of the Navy, due
to the growth, increased complexity, and scope of the
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assigned missions. The need -for a military agency to inter-
face between the Secretary of the Navy and the bureaus
became obvious. Thus, a series o-f proposals were made -for
the establishment o-f a general sta-f-f. Finally in 1909, a
General Board of the Navy was established. Its members
served as advisors to the Secretary, with the President of
the General Board serving essentially as Naval Chief of
Staff. Congressional hearings resulted in passage of a law
in 1915 which created the Office of the Chief of Naval
Operations which was charged with 1) the operation of the
fleet, 2) the preparation and readiness of Naval forces for
use in the defense of the United States and its allies, and
3) fulfilling a peacetime role. CRef. 103
B. NAVAL RESERVES
1 . History
Naval Reserve is the term broadly applied to all of
the naval forces of a country which aire organized and given
professional naval training in times of peace, but which Are
not continuously employed in the Navy during such periods.
The purpose of maintaining a reserve force is to provide, at
the least expense to the country, the large numbers of
trained personnel needed by the Navy to mobilize for war.
During periods of mobilization, reserves sire used to bring
the complements of stations and ships in commission up to
combat strength and to man other ships and stations that
must be added immediately. From the point of view of cost
13
alone, the maintenance o-f a Navy o-f this size continuously,
in times o-f peace, would impose an intolerable burden on the
country.
Navies have traditionally been national rather than
locally-based organizations. The Anglo-American tradition o-f
armies as an outgrowth o-f locally-based and recruited
militia results in a comparatively greater understanding o-f
and a-f-finity -for reserves in the ground -forces. Navies,
requiring extremely large capital investment in ships and
shore facilities, and acting on behal-f of the central gov-
ernment at sea rather than on behal-f o-f local interest, do
not have a tradition o-f orginating locally. This explains
the late development o-f the Naval Reserve and its limited
size compared to reserve ground -forces. CRe-f. Ill
Until shortly be-fore World War I, the only Naval Reserve
•forces of the United States were the naval militia units of
a few states. The first such unit was organized in Massachu-
setts on March 18, 1890, as part of the already existing
land militia. CRef. 121 Other sea coast and lake states
followed this example, but the movement was sponsored
largely by amateur sailors and navy enthusiasts in civilian
life rather than by the federal or state governments.
In 1892, there was included in the annual naval appro-
priation act of Congress an item of *25,000 for "Arming and
Equipping Naval Militia". This was the first federal appro-
priation for this purpose. Ships were loaned to naval
militia organizations and material and equipment were issued
14
to them by the various bureaus of the Navy
Department. Adminstration o-f this e-ffort was handled by the
0-f-Fice of the Naval Militia. Some equipment was also loaned
by the War Department. The states themselves purchased cer
—
tain items of clothing and equipment, but in the early years
the members of these organizations often defrayed, out of
their own pockets, much of the cost of keeping the naval
militia units alive. Annual practice cruises were made by
some of the organizations and drills were conducted in the
National Guard armories.
When the Spanish—American War broke out in 1898, no
statutory provision had been made for incorporating the
personnel of the naval militia into the federal naval esta-
blishment in case of emergencies. The governors of the
various states having naval militia units salved the problem
by granting leaves of absence to the naval militia personnel
which permitted them to join the regular Navy. Some of the
units were kept intact and manned ships as a unit, while
others were scattered throughout the fleet. The Naval
Militia personnel so fully demonstrated their value and
efficiency as part of the sea forces of the nation that the
Navy Department after the war strongly recommended the
establishment of a national naval reserve. Bills were intro-
duced in Congress to bring this about but it took fifteen
years for Congress to legislate the establishment of a
federal naval reserve. In the interim, the state naval
15
organizations resumed functioning as militia units and the
Navy Department extended the assignment o-f ships to them -for
training purposes. Sixteen states still have naval militias
and in a number o-f states individuals have a dual status as
both naval militiamen and members o-f the Naval Reserve.
In February 1914, "An Act to Promote the E-f-ficiency of
the Naval Militia and for other Purposes," commonly known as
the Naval Militia Act, became law. All states having such
naval militia units in were required to organize them in
accordance with the af orementioried Act. On March 3, 1915,
another act was passed which created the federal Naval
Reserve and set standards for the naval militia which were
consistent with those set for the Reserve activities. This
reserve was composed of men honorably discharged from the
regular Navy. Retainer pay (which is called retirement pay
today) was provided and the men were required to keep a
uniform on hand. This act laid the foundation for the Naval
Reserve as it exists today, although many changes have been
made in the details of its organization, training and admin-
istration since then. In August 1916, with World War I
already under way. Congress passed an act establishing a new
Naval Reserve force and federalizing the naval militia.
CRef. 131
During World War I, about 30,000 reserve officers and
300,000 enlisted reservists served on active duty. Among
them were 12,000 female reservists who worked as yeomanettes
in Navy and Marine Corps offices. A group of flying
16
enthusiasts -From Yale University, who had bought their own
planes, volunteered their services to the Navy before the
United States entered the war. This first Yale unit
pioneered the modern Naval Air Reserve. CRef. 14D
In World War II, almost SOX of the Navy's uniformed
force were reservists, but most of them had not participated
in the Naval Reserve before going on active duty. After
World War II, there were more than 130,000 people in the
organized Naval Reserve. Also, there were hundreds of
training centers for reserves located throughout the United
States where classroom training was emphasized, and some
ships and aircraft were assigned to reserve forces- During
the Korean War, more than 130,000 reservists served on
active duty, and approximately 75yC of the combat sorties
were flown by reserve aviators. During the Vietnam War, two
SeaBee battalions were mobilized from the reserve forces and
served in Vietnam. CRef. 15D
These wars demonstrated that a small, efficient regular
Navy can quickly absorb a large number of recruits from
civilian life. In other words, professional sailors need
only be a small part of the sea forces of a country in
modern warfare if intensive training and indoctrination of
the Naval Reserve is maintained. It would, in fact, be
inaccurate and misleading to speak of the United States Navy
of World War II as composed of regular and of reserve
personnel. During the war all were in a temporary status
17
concerning rank and ratings, with equal opportunities -for
advancement and assignment to duties based on the experience
and qualifications o-f the individual. The principal differ-
ence between the reservist and regular during declared war
is that, as a rule, the latter planned to make the Navy a
career when he entered the service, whereas only a small
percentage of the former planned to remain in the Navy
beyond the period of hostilities. After each period of
conflict, the armed forces aire drastically reduced and the
reserves ^re the first to be returned to civilian life.
The mid—to—late 1970s were a time of turmoil for the
Naval Reserve. A Select Reserve force (a cadre who regularly
attend drills and fill immediate mobilization requirements
when needed), which had numbered near 129,000 in 1973, was
proposed for gradually lower levels- This culminated in the
President's budget submission for fiscal year 1930 which
called for an average strength of only 4S,700. Congressional
action repeatedly authorized and funded higher levels than
requested, but the Selected Reserve strength did drop to a
post-World War II low of 81,000 in 197S. CRef. 16D
There were three major events during the 1970s which
were the source of turmoil for the Naval Reserves. Their
cumulative result has been to increase the dependence of the
Armed Forces on Reserves should any military action beyond a
minor show of force be required.
The first of these was the end of the draft in 1973,
which had been approved as law in 1971. This change almost
18
certainly resulted in the tacit acceptance of active -force
strengths lower than Mould have been considered prudent had
a dra-ft been available to -Fill the ranks. The reserve compo-
nents remained the sole available source of trained units
and individuals for augmentation of the active forces upon
mobilization until such time as conscription could be rein-
stated. Deprived of draft-pressured voluntary enlistments,
the Selected Reserve declined 19% in six years. The net
effect of the end of the draft has been to increase the
responsibilities of the reserve forces, as well as the end
strengths needed to fill these requirements, while simul-
taneously drastically decreasing their ability to fill their
ranks. CRef. 17D
The second event was related to our lack of success in
the Vietnam War. Subdued by the Vietnam War, U.S. defense
planning once again focused on familiar terrain, a war in
Europe. Planning for global contingencies was sharply cur-
tailed. Force structuring was to center about how best to
fight the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies in Europe,
on the land flanks of Europe, and in waters and airspace
adjacent to Europe. This redefinition of U.S. strategy, by
geographically constricting the potential 3irea of U.S. mili-
tary responsibility, decreased the mobilization requirements
of the Armed Forces, including the requirements for
Reserves. Along with this redefinition was the belief that
nuclear weapons would be employed in the early stages of
19
such con-flict, thus reducing the need -for rein-f orcements.
Those that adhered to a short war philosophy, concluded that
the reserve -forces had to be capable o-f rapid response.
Based on this conclusion, legislation was passed, in 1976,
to provide the Secretary o-f De-fense with the authority to
call up to 50,000 Selected Reservists (raised to 100,000 in
1980) to active duty for up to 90 days without a declaration
o-f war or national emergency. Originally, the proponents o-f
the short war philosophy thought that it would require less
reserve personnel , but the need -for a rapid response had
actually increased the need -for a viable reserve -force.
The third event that af-fected the reserve organization
involved the collision o-f the a-f orementioned short war phi-
losophy with the realities of international politics. Soviet
and Soviet—proxy military involvement in the Third World,
effectively precluded the ability of the U.S. to adhere to
an exclusively European scenario. At the same time, adher-
ence to the short war scenario decreased. While the short-
war scenario was accepted as one possible outcome of U.S.
Soviet hostilities in Europe, equally plausible scenarios
involving protracted conflicts could be constructed. There-
fore, it was not prudent for the U.S. to plan for only one
contingency, especially one which called for the smallest
force structure and minimum funds. Scenarios involving pro-
tracted conflicts suggested the need for a larger Reserve
force and more emphasis on mobilization. CRef. 18D
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During this period. Project Readiness was implemented to
improve the capabilities o-f the Naval Reserve to meet the
challenges o-F its new position of importance. This program
structured the augmentation personnel o-f the Naval Reserve
into units that were tied directly to their gaining command
o-f the active -force unit to which they would mobilize.
Training was -focused on speci-fic requirements of each mobi-
lization billet, and emphasis was placed on having the
Selected Reserve unit train with its gaining command during
annual active—duty training. The weekend away training
(WET) program has expanded this concept to include
increasing amounts of inactive duty (weekend) training with
the gaining command or at a centralized training site. CRef.
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The Naval Reserve has progressed from a structure in
which a large portion of its personnel, those who would
augment the active force, were organized in manpower pools
called naval air reserve divisions ar surface reserve divi-
sions, to a structure of reinforcing and sustaining units
that linked directly to their gaining commands. Previously,
there were pools of qualified personnel who did not have
adequate training opportunities to maintain the skills
gained on active duty because they did not know what spe-
cific training was required of them and the Naval Reserve
did not have the capability to train them. Currently, there
ArE; precise mobilization billets with appropriate qualifica-
tion requirements for all augmentation personnel. In
21
addition, the Naval Reserve's organization has been
improved. In 1983, in recognition o-f the emerging role of
the Naval Reserve, the Chie-f o-f Naval Reserve staff in New
Orleans, Louisiana, was reorganized and elevated into a
force command (Commander, Naval Reserve Force) with two
subordinate commands (Commander, Naval Surface Reserve Force
and Commander, Naval Air Reserve Force).
Organization, administration, training and supply of
the Naval Reserve Sire under the direction of the Chief of
Naval Operations, aided by an Assistant Chief of Naval
Operations for the Naval Reserve. The Bureaus and offices of
the Department of the Navy hold the same relationship and
responsibility to the Reserve as they do to the regular
Navy. The next section discusses the composition of the
reserves.
2. Force Composition
There a.re almost 400,000 men and women serving in the
Naval Reserve today. The bulk of these, almost 250,000, Are
members of the Ready Reserve. The Selected Reserve, which is
the Navy's source of immediate mobilization manpower, is the
core of the Ready Reserve. There Are approximately 105,000
selected reservists. They drill one weekend a month and
perform two weeks of annual active duty in a paid status.
These are the "active" reservists who are not on active
duty. CRef. 203
'?r>
The remainder of the Ready Reserve includes about 74,000
individuals who are on -Full-time active duty. Almost 14,000
o-f these aire career active—duty reservists responsible -for
the training and administration o-f reservists; they are
called TARs. The balance o-F the ready reservist on active
duty Sire active mariners and Of-fi cer Candidate School
students and graduates.
There are another 62,000 individual ready reservists,
almost 55,000 o-f Mhom do not drill at all. Additionally, the
remaining 7,000 drill without pay and are assigned to volun-
tary training units (VTUs> . VTUs train at every sur-face and
air reserve training site. Finally, there are about 9,000
Naval Reserve 0-fficer Training Corps cadets who Are also
members o-f the ready reserve. The Retired Reserve accounts
-for another 133,000 members, and there are about 13,000
members in the Standby Reserve. Retired reservists and
standby reservists Bre liable for active duty in time of war
or national emergency declared by Congress or when otherwise
authorized by law, but only after the Ready Reserve has been
called.
Broadly speaking, the Naval Reserve effort in times of
peace is concerned with two classes of citizens. The first
class consists of those who have little or no active duty
experience. This class is recruited principally from high
school age and up. A second class consists of those who have
had naval experience and training but have left the ser-
vice. The aim in the case of this class is to conserve and
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keep current the naval experience o-f the individuals without
undue interference with their normal civilian lives.
These two classes are directed into three main programs
o-f junior enlisted personnel -for the Selected Reserve. One
is the Active Mariner (AM) program- Recruits enlisting under
this program spend three years as part o-f the active—duty
force. Following this period, they are obligated to spend an
additional two years as members o-f the SELRE3. Over the
period from fiscal year 1979 to fiscal year 1982, approxi-
mately 6,000 AMs reached SELRES drilling units each year. A
second source of junior enlisted personnel for SELRES is
the Ready Mariner (RM) program. Ready Mariner recruits
undergo an initial six to twelve month period of active duty
for training. They are then obligated to drill with the
SELRES for the remainder of a six year term. Before FY 19S4,
this program was relatively small, with annual accessions of
approximately 2,000. In FY 1984, the Ready Mariner program
was expanded and modified. It is now called the Sea/Air
Mariner (SAM) program and is scheduled to have 10,000 acces-
sions per year. The SAM program retains many of the features
of the old RM program (recruits receive training but do not
serve with the active—duty fleet before joining the SELRES
drilling units).
Navy veterans (NAVETs) Are the final source of junior
enlisted personnel for the SELRES. NAVETs in paygrades E—
4
and below are generally individuals who enlisted in the
active Navy under a -four year USN contract and then chose
not to reenlist in the regular Navy but did decide to join
the SELRES.
As mentioned earlier, the SELRES is the center o-f the
Naval Reserve. Most a^re presently NAVETs. The bulk of this
community, approximately 80,000, serve in the Sur-face
Reserve Force. Sur-face reservists train at 235 reserve cen-
ters located in every state and in Puerto Rico. The centers
are administered by 16 readiness commands. Also included in
the surface reserves are 17 reserve naval mobile construc-
tion battalions, the SeaBees. More than 23,000 selected
reservists are members of the Naval Air Reserve Force. They
are assigned to more than 50 reserve squadrons with more
than 400 aircraft of IS different types which are located at
23 sites in the United States.
The various SELRES units have differing structures and
differing mobilization missions- There are three types of
units:
1. Commissioned Units — complete operational entities
such as ships, squadrons, and construction battalions
2. Reinforcing Units — those ready to augment active
Navy ships and squadrons, and afloat staffs
3. Sustaining Units — those ready to augment active
Navy bases, stations, and other support organizations.
Types of commissioned units today include nine modern
frigates, IS minesweepers, four special boat units, 12
cargo—handl ing battalions, two carrier air wings, two patrol
wings, a helicopter wing, and a fleet logistic support wing.
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Rein-forcing and sustaining units are composed o-f experienced
professionals in more than 30 -fields including medicine,
submarine -forces, uni-fied/joint shore commands, intelli-
gence, military seal if t, air systems. Merchant Marine, law,
and oceanography. This is designed to fill the trained
manpower needs of Navy units that are manned at less than
wartime requirements.
The men and women who make up the reinforcing and sus-
taining units know where they are needed if mobilized.
Usually, they train with their gaining command on weekends
and on annual active duty training. Commissioned units would
mobilize with their own equipment, as a unit, to expand the
force structure of the Navy. These reserve ships, squadrons,
and SeaBee and cargo battalions would be employed where
needed. CRef. 211
3. Present Missions
Naval reservists man and operate all of the Navy's
U.S. based logistic airlift squadrons. All of the Navy's
light attack helicopter squadrons and combat search and
rescue capability are in the Naval Reserve- In addition, the
Naval Reserve contains all of the Navy's inshore underwater
warfare units. Other examples of the missions being
presently carried out by the Naval Reserve arei
99 percent of Naval Control of Shipping Organization
S6 percent of Navy cargo-handling battalions
86 percent of Naval ocean minesweepers
35 percent of Military Seal if t Command military personnel
68 percent of mobile construction battalions
66 percent of special boat forces
34 percent of Naval Intelligence personnel
26
30 percent o-f Naval medical support personnel
14 percent o-f Navy tactical carrier air Mings CRe-f. 22D
As can be seen -from the above list, the Naval Reserve contri-
butes signi-f icantly to the national defense.
4. New Missions
Historically, the Naval Reserve was issued equipment
which was outdated and no longer used by the Navy. This
policy often created a reserve force that was incompatible
with the Navy's current missions. Modern aircraft carriers,
for example, were not equipped to support the reserve A—7B
aircraft and World War II—vintage destroyers were simply not
sophisticated enough to play an important role in
antisubmarine warfare. CRef . 233
This problem was first addressed in 1982 when Secretary
of the Navy John Lehman announced a drive to update Naval
Reserve equipment. He termed it "horizontal intergrati on"
;
that is, the assignment of the same types of equipment to
the active and reserve forces. This is aptly demonstrated by
recent delivery to the Reserves of the new A/F— 18 aircraft,
KnoK -class frigates, Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigates and
up—to—date support ships. These have given the Naval Reserve
increased capabilities.
The Naval Reserve is unique among the services in the
employment of its forces during peacetime- Certainly, the
Navy recognizes the talent and capabilities within its
reserve ranks- But with its forward deployed strategy, the
Navy faces a greater challenge in optimizing Reserve forces.
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A list o-F possible new missions -for the Naval Reserve was
part o-f the "Report to Congress on the Navy's Total Force"
released in February 1984. This list includes:
1. Establishing a new land-based aerial tanking mission
for the Naval Air Reserve
2. Establishing a new reserve squadron augment unit -for
the Navy's carrier onboard delivery (COD) squadrons
3. Modernizing and assigning Naval Air Reserve carrier
air wings to the 15th and 16th aircra-ft carrier battle
groups
4. Consolidating P-3C squadron augment units into
master augment units and making the P—3C aircra-ft
and weapon system trainers available -for reserve use
5. Trans-f erring Navy repair ships to the Naval Reserve
Force to support its ships
6. Creating unique roles -for reserve responsi-
bility in maritime coastal de-fense and Caribbean
sea lines o-f communications protection CRe-f. 24D
In the -future, the Navy will undoubtedly assign even
more responsibility to its reserve -forces. The Reserves'
major challenge is to ensure that it recruits, trains, and
retains the numbers and types o-f selected reservists
necessary to meet the requirements o-f the expanding Naval
Reserve.
5. Sea/Air Mariner (SAM) Program
As the Naval Reserves' missions increase, so will its
manpower requirements. The Navy determines how many people
it needs in the SELRES through the Navy's Manpower Mobiliza-
tion System (NAMMOS) . bJhile projecting its total manpower
requirements -for mobilisation, the Navy also determines the
number of reservists needed. The NAMMOS requirement
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projected to fiscal year 1989 is for more than 132,000 indi-
viduals in the SELRES, about 30,000 more than the fiscal
year 1984 number. CRef. 25D
With increasing requirements, a new program to increase
accessions into the Naval Reserve must be initiated. Since
most vacant reserve billets consisted of pay grades E-2
through E—4, the Navy implemented a new program to recruit
non-prion-service (NPS) men and women. This new initiative,
the SAM program, was implemented in fisal year 1984. A
primary requirement of the SAM program was to insure quality
as well as quantity to fill specific junior enlisted vacan-
cies in designated units, particularly ships, aircraft
squadrons, SeaBee battalions, and medical units.
The Naval Reserve's goal is to recruit 10,000 SAMs per
year. Men and women between the ages of 17 and 33 sars eli-
gible to join. If a high school junior signs up for the SAM
program, he or she can attend recruit training between the
junior and senior years of school. After high school, SAM '
s
may attend a Navy "A" school or receive apprenticeship
training (ATP) and then return to their hometown reserve
unit for additional on—the—job training. Some may even be
selected for advanced training at Navy "C" schools. A
requirement that is often overlooked states that the r&B&rvp
applicant can not reside more than 100 miles from the
reserve drilling site. This has the effect of reducing the
pool of eligible enlistees drastically, because of the
reasons previously mentioned. Naval Reserve units Ar^
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capital intensive which limits the number o-f Naval Reserve
units in a geographic area. (Recent Army studies indicate
that reservists more than 35 miles -from the drilling site
are less likely to fulfill their service obligation.) CRef.
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All personnel enlisting in the SAM program must enlist
for a period of six years in the Naval Reserves. Enlistees
are required to complete a period of Initial Active Duty for
Training (lADT) of not less than 12 weeks in length to
include recruit training and either "A" school, or appren-
ticeship technical training. The amount of time spent on
active duty depends upon the "A" school or apprenticeship
program attended, but the maximum is 18 months-
There Sire two pecuniary incentive programs to encourage
enlistees to fill those areas where shortages exist. The
first incentive is a bonus plan, in which the enlistee
receives *1,000 at the completion of lADT, *500 upon comple-
tion of the fourth year of reserve service, and the last
$500 upon completion of the sixth year, for a total of
*2,000. The second incentive is designated an educational
assistance plan for those enlistees who desire to continue
their education beyond the high school level. They are
eligible for a maximum of $4,000, with a maximum of $1,000
for any 12 month period. It must be emphasized that these
incentive programs are only for ratings which are most
>0
dif-ficult to -fill, i.e. those with the highest qualification
standards. CRef. 27D
SAM applicants are screened by their AFQT scores, educa-
tion level, and age using the same SCREEN table used -for
regular Navy recruits. CRef. 2SD The SAM applicant, being a
moonlighter, may possess diferent attributes and attitudes
from one who enlists into the regular Navy. Additionally,
the reserve environment is quite unique. Both of these
factors would seem to indicate that there should be dif-
ferent screening standards for entry into the SAM program as
opposed to those for the regular Navy.
About one in five of the new SAM recruits is scheduled
to become a member of the reserve's medical force, which is
the fastest growing program in the Naval Reserve. From fev<er
than 3,000 officers and enlisted personnel in 1983, the
authorized medical force strength will grow to almost 20,000
by the end of 1987. One major effort underway in the reserve
medical force is the creation of augmenting units to staff
the new fleet hospital program. These hospitals will be
established over the next four to five years and will pro-
vide emergency medical czAre in case of national emergency.
III. LITERATURE REVIEW '
Unlike the active Navy, there is a meager amount of
literature concerning the United States Selected Reserve
manpower, and in particular, the Naval SELRES. Because of
the larger size o-f the Army Reserve and the National Guard,
most o-f the manpower reports in the reserve area have been
sponsored by these organizations. The Navy, with its
increased emphasis on the total -force concept, is giving
more attention to Naval Reserve research. Not all that has
been written on the subject of reserve forces will be
covered in this review. Rather, a synopsis of the subjects
will be presented to set the stage for this thesis.
A. TOTAL FORCE CONCEPT
A paper written at the Air Command and Staff College,
Washington, D.C., by Arthur MoKon stressed the effects of
active Navy policies on the SELRES forces in consonance with
the total force concept (integration of active and reserve
capabilities to maximize military effectiveness). CRef. 291
This total force concept is closely related to the all-
volunteer force concept, in the sense that the total force
policy assigned increased roles and responsibility to the
reserves and the termination of the draft ended the major
incentive for reserve enlistments. Moxon's major points
were:
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1. The SELRE5 currently depends primarily on prior
service individuals to meet annual accession require-
ments.
2. The De-fense Manpower Commission assumes that non-
prior-service recruits will come -from the same pool
that provides manpower -for the active -forces, thus
making it more dif-ficult for active Navy recruiters
to meet their recruiting goals.
3. More than 12 percent o-f all individuals undergoing
military training and education are members o-f reserve
components. Both changes in active -force training
policy and reserve NPS accession requirements affect
the training pipeline. This was brought to the fore-
front with the implementation of the SAM program and
the added 5,000 "A" School participants annually.
4. Reserves should seek a higher quality recruit than the
active forces because reserve personnel train only
part—time and must retain skills over longer
periods with less practice and supervision. CRef. 303
There have been proposals for an increased substitution
of capital equipment for manpower which are based upon the
rapid increases in the relative price of military labor
since 1971, but the nature of reserve duty limits the
savings from this substitution. Essentially, the reserves
employ a part-time labor force in contrast to the full—time
labor force in the active component, and capital goods are
more difficult to employ on a part—time basis. Thus, reserve
units become more expensive as capital equipment is substi-
tuted for manpower. Of course, reserve units have to be
competent in using the same equipment they will be required
to use when mobilized. This is consistent with the total
force concept and is a primary reason for the increasing
cost of equipping the reserves.
Except -for the highly praised Air Reserve components,
"...the Naval Reserve continues to be criticized, sometimes
unfairly, as the least e-F-fective and most misused o-f the
reserve components". CRe-f.312 Moxon -feels that the primary
cause for the state o-f reserve readiness is the persistent
unwillingness of the active Navy to give more than nominal
support to reserve forces and acknowledge the utility of
reserves in performing naval missions in both peace and war.
This situation has been remedied, to some extent, by the
emphasis on the total force concept. He notes however, the
total force concept must be given adequate financial backing
if it is to be fully implemented.
B. COST OF RESERVE PROGRAMS
Deborah Clay—Mendez of the Center for Naval Analysis
(CNA) , was one of the first to specifically compare the cost
of two NFS reserve enlistment programs, the SAM and Active
Mariner (AM) programs, to the enlistment of PS (NAVETs) into
the Naval Reserves. SAM costing data was estimated by using
Ready Mariner (RM) historical data. CRef. 323
The cost comparisons included recruiting and training
cost of SAMs and AMs and the man—years of service they
provide to the SELRES. Because of the recruiting and
training costs involved, the junior enlisted man—years pro-
vided to the SELRES via the mandatory drilling programs
(SAMs and AMs) atre actually more expensive than the SELRES
man—years provided by the more senior NAVETs. Training and
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recruiting costs for Navets are assumed to be sunk cost and
are not considered.
Clay-Mendez concluded that, in the short-run, SELRES can
meet part o-f the increased requirements -for junior enlisted
personnel at less cost through the use o-f higher NAVET
bonuses. The bulk o-f junior enlisted personnel are provided
by the mandatory drilling programs but the SELRES man—years
provided by these programs are relatively expensive.
What has not been addressed in these economic studies is
the problem o-f increasing the number of NAVETs in the
SELRES. As a result, the E1-E4 billets will be filled by
more senior personnel. With senior personnel being placed in
E1-E4 billets, attrition is likely to increase. Of course, a
much simpler answer is to simply reduce the number of NPS
mandatory drillers needed in the SELRES. Presently, the SAM
program recruiting goals, based on mobilization require-
ments, Sire 10,000 per year. In a reevaluation of these
mobilization requirements, Dr. Jean Fletcher of CNA con-
cluded that only 6,700 SAMs atrs needed per year. Also, if
normal discharges were prohibited in times of mobilization,
the SAM requirements drop to only 3,200 per year. CRef.331
This would drastically reduce reserve manpower costs because
SAMs Ars the most expensive, per man-year, of SELRES
personnel
.
C. FACTORS AFFECTING RESERVE PARTICIPATION
William McNaught , in a 1981 Rand report CRef. 343,
discussed the reserve participation decision in terms of how
it differs from a civilian job decision and how it relates
to the decision to join the active forces.
The reserve participation decision is a decision to take
a second job, or moonlight. If workers were free to set
their own hours, they would set their length of work accor-
ding to their marginal valuation of time. There is a rivalry
between the desire for material goods and services available
through wages and the dislike of work and the desire to
enjoy additional free time. Because fi^ed working hours Are
the rule in most parts of the economy, many workers must
work more hours or fewer hours than they prefer. The secon-
dary job market offers those who desire additional income
through increased working hours an opportunity to obtain a
more flexible work schedule, one which increases individual
satisfaction. CRef. 353
The term moonlighting is usually associated with
civilian employment but in this case the term can also refer
to service in the reserves. It is important that one be
aware of the differences between moonlighting in a civilian
job and moonlighting in the reserves. The following is a
list of the most relevant differences:
1. SELRES SLre obligated for up to six years
2. SELRES must accept military discipline
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3. SELRES can be called to -full-time military duty
during mobilization or civil emergency
4. Drill schedules are inflexible
5- Large travel costs to attend drills can easily
offset any gains associated with reserve service
6. SELRES attend 16 hours/month while civilian moon-
lighters average 13 hours/week in a second job.
McNaught's report included a model to predict reserve
participation which was based upon the characteristics of a
moonlighter (younger, more educated, with larger families,
smaller primary incomes, greater housing expenses, fewer
primary work hours, than those who do not moonlight) His
reserve participation (R) model is stated below:
R = f (W,C,S,H,U,P,I,T,X)
where,
R = Reserve participation (number of reserve enlistments)
W = reserve wage rate
C = primary civilian wage rate
S = secondary wage rate
H = primary hours worked
U = unemployment rate
P = population of eligible enlistees
I = the amount of information available about reserve
enlistment opportunities
T = travel cost for the selres to attend drills
X = includes: special enlistment options, seasonal and
regional dummies, etc. CRef . 361
The regression variables' coefficients that were
obtained using the above model of NFS Reserves participation
for the Army Reserve, Air National Guard and Marine Corps
Reserve showed little similarity between services. For some
variables, the sign of the coefficient was not the same for
each service. The elasticities with the strongest influence
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on NPS Reserve participation in all three services, were
secondary Mages and primary working hours, with the latter
dominant. Elasticities -for the other variables show that
reserve enlistments increase with increases in military pay
and unemployment, and decrease with increases in pay
received on the primary job, and hours worked on the primary
job.
McNaught's model is not very di-f-ferent -from active -force
models. He states that the NPS enlistment decision in the
Naval Reserves has many o-f the same characteristics o-f a
decision to enlist in the active military. (Approximately 5—
15 percent o-f the reserve personnel joined the active -forces
between FY78—S3. ) CRe-f. 371 In fact, many NPS reserve enlis-
tees Are disguised active duty enlistees who use reserve
entrance procedures to sample military li-fe or to circumvent
active -force enlistment screens. Thus, -for NPS personnel,
the decision to enter the reserves may be very similar to
the decision to enter the active duty.
Lawrence Curran and Aline Quest er, CNA, used in-formation
-from a survey o-f enlisted reservists and -from personnel
files to determine what factors influence continued partici-
pation in the SELRES. They found that reservists who were
more dissatisfied with their experience on active duty than
they were with their general reserve experience, were more
likely to leave the reserves. This lends some comfirmation
to the hypothesis of similarity between active and reserve
enlistment decisions. It also supports the idea that
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reservists could be screened (to reduce attrition) as i -f
they were enlisting for active duty. CRe-f. 383
Aline Quester has also looked into the propensity o-f
active forces personnel to join the SELRES after their
normal tour of active duty has been terminated. She found
that the probability of a NAVET joining the SELRES is posi-
tively related to reserve pay, the unemployment rate, and
the Navy rating in which he served. The average affiliation
rate (the rate at which NAVETs join the SELRES after comple-
ting their active duty commitment) was 13 percent but the
rate varied widely across ratings. All rates were low enough
to suggest that there is a substantial pool of NAVETs in the
civilian population. As might be expected AMs behave as do
NAVETs; generally there is only one year of active duty
separating the two groups. This result is consistent with
other findings. CRef . 391
David Grissmer of the Rand Corporation has written
several papers on reserve attrition CRef. 40, 411 which
discuss variables for predicting success of reserve enlis-
tees. Success was defined as completing one's contractual
obligation. Among all the variables tested, education level
and mental aptitude were the strongest predictors of attri-
tion. This may be due to the fact that individuals with more
education and higher mental aptitude tend to make more
informed and thoughtful enlistment decisions. In addition,
it may be that these people are more able to meet the
cognitive and psychological demands o-f training. Also, indi-
viduals with high school diplomas have demonstrated their
ability to "complete" education. Other predictors included: .
1) gender (females had higher attrition rates than males)
,
2) age (older enlistees had higher attrition rates than
younger ones), and 3) r3iC.e (blacks had lower attrition rates
than whites)
.
Bonuses, when used to increase retention rates, were only
slighty success-f ul , but lengthened the average term o-f
commitment considerably. These longer terms o-f commitment
result in increased man-years o-f service. CRe-f . 421
A 1980 report -from the O-f f ice o-f the Assistant Secretary
o-f De-fense -for Manpower, Reserve A-f -fairs and Logistics,
stated that promotion opportunities have greater retention
impact than reserve pay. Thus, grade distribution and promo-
tion policies should be considered as important variables
in solving reserve shortages in the 4—10 year length—o-f —
service range, whereas retirement bene-fits have more influ-
ence in subsequent years. CRe-f. 431 Also, the Naval Reserve
has historically selected personel with speci-fic skills.
This results in an age distribution which is higher than
that observed for NFS regular enlistees. The overall
demographic trends (especially the decrease in the available
population pool) will ultimately have their greatest impact
on those components which draw most heavily from the the 17—
19 year old males. This is the primary market for the SAM
program.
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Hardy Merritt, Mhile at the National De-fense University,
emphasized leadership style as the strongest factor influ-
encing attrition -from the Naval Reserves. I-f this is the
case, then leadership style will play a more important role
as the number o-f NPS personnel increases in the SELRES
through the SAM program. Merritt suggested that the situa-
tional approach to leadership should be stressed in -favor o-F
the predominant authoritarian approach. One must consider,
when evaluating leadership styles, the differences and simi-
larities between NAVETs and SAMs, and how such differences
should influence leadership style. CRef. 44!] Parti.ng from
the general concensus, Merritt believes that retirement
benefits are substantially more important to retention in
the SELRES than current pay levels. Using his model, Merritt
determined the retention effects of stopping retirement
benefits altogether (with bonuses offered as substitutes),
and reducing retirement annuities by 21—30/1. The latter
alternative would result in a decrease in retention of 4,400
SELRES, while the former would result in the loss of 17,800
SELRES.
The Naval Reservist does not rely on his reserve pay as
the primary source of income. Therefore, pay levels above a
designated minimal baseline may not significantly contribute
to retention. Abraham Maslow developed a framework that
demonstrates the strength of certain needs. According to
Maslow, CRef. 453 there seems to be a hierarchy into which





4. esteem ' -
5. self —actual ization.
As the needs at the top o-F the above list are met, people
move down the list to -ful-fill other needs. In other words,
i -f wages are su-f-ficient to satis-fy lower level needs, then
people will be motivated to -ful-fill higher level needs,
which may not be related to additional income, or i -f so, not
as strong a relationship as did the lower needs.
Some o-f the other relevant in-fluences on reserve reten-
tion are the employer, military peers, -friends, and -family,
with the employer having the greatest impact on the level
o-f reserve participation. These are area^ in which the
Naval Reserve could try to exert more influence to increase
-favorable attitudes toward reserve participation. iierritt,
in a joint paper with Milton Boykin and Richard Smith,
presented a checklist o-f items the individual reserve unit
can do to increase retention. CRe-f. 46D
D. SCREENING
A briefing by a CNA research team gives a strategy to
improve SELRES retention. CRef. 47D The strategy includes:
1. Revise Recruiter incentives
2. Target retention management
a. early attention to problem areas
b. use affiliation bonuses for NAVETs
c- more efficient screening CRef. 483
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This thesis will concentrate in the last area, screening.
Screening has always been a major component o-f personnel
selection. In the military, the emphasis has been on appli-
cants who are most likely to attrite. There are two major
dimensions entered into the prediction regression
equations: demographic/biographic -Factors and aptitude (as
measured by the score on the Armed Forces Qual i -f icati on
Test, AFQT)
.
Aptitude measurement has been a traditional Area a-f
concern and application within the military manpower arena
since World War I. CRef. 493 This emphasis is particularly
applicable with a relatively large or unlimited manpower
pool. The trend towards using aptitude/intelligence tests
-for attrition prediction derived -from their earlier use as a
personnel screening and classi -f icati on device o-f new
recuits. It is thus a natural outgrowth o-f what was avail-
able to researchers within the operational systems without
the requirement -for additional tests, surveys, or interviews
that intrude upon the operating -forces. The underlying
assumption in this approach is that those with a higher
probability of attrition could be screened out since the
major determinant o-f attrition is seen to be within the
i ndi vi dual
.
Demographic data has also been used since World War I
in predicting attrition rates -for population subgroups. The
primary reason demographic data is used is because o-f its
availability upon recruit entry. Also, the bivariate rela-
tionship between the variables o-f age and education level to
attrition has been shown to be consistent. Attrition rates
predicted by sex, race, and marital status have not pre-
sented a consistent trend across various cohorts. Thus, the
relationships between demographic characteristics and attri-
tion need to be reevaluated -frequently.
The major in-fluence o-f the demographic structure is the
fertility rate, which determines the growth rate o-f the
native population. It is predicted that this rate will
remain at its current low level or decline -further, and that
higher wages and lower employment will ensue as employers
compete -for shrinking cohorts o-f younger workers. As this
competition intensi-fies and labor markets tighten, women and
older workers will be drawn into, or retained at work in
greater numbers. This tightening o-f the labor market, in
conjunction with the pressures o-f population growth and
political instability abroad, will increase the flow of
immigrants. The effects of these events will be sweeping,
but they will be distributed unevenly across the country as
the population shifts out of larger cities and to the South
and West, and as the immigrants settle disproportionately in
particular areas. CRef. 50] It is possible that changes in
the demographic makeup of the population may affect the
relationships between demographic characteristics and
attri tion.
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0-f the a-Forementioned items to increase SELRES reten-
tion, a more efficient screening system appears worthy of
immediate study and is likely to be cost effective. Since
personnel applying for entrance into the SAM program are
screened for elibility as one of the first requirements, it
is reasonable to try to eliminate individuals with a low
probability of completing training, before a lot of money
has been invested in them.
Screening in itself is not automatically inexpensive.
Screening procedures which include easily available demogra-
phic data and AFQT information are relatively inexpensive
and have proven reliability. Additional data has proven
valuable in screening but it has been either inconsistent
for the whole population of eligible applicants or very
expensive to obtain, or both. (It is vital to be assured
that the screening procedure in use is saving more than it
cost to develop and to administer.)
IV. ftNALYSIS -
A. DATA FILE
The data used -For this thesis were prepared by the
Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) at Monterey, Cali-fornia-
The three individual data -files were developed -from active
Navy, Ready Mariner and SAM personnel data -files.
1 . Active Navy
The active Navy data file is composed of a fiscal
yeAr 1978 to fiscal year 19S4 cohort of non—prior-service
accessions- This cohort file is a longitudinal register of
all accessions for a given year, combined with a portion of
the active current file for the corresponding cohort. The
resultant file depicts each individual in relation to 174
variables in a revised DMDC cohort format. This cohort file
was used because it is current, contains data on a large
number of individuals (approximately one—half million) and
is readily available. It should be noted that the data from
any given year may be confounded by political, social, and
economic factors which are difficult to measure. This
suggests that mul ti pie—year cohorts are advantageous to aid
in dampening out these year—to—year fluctuations. However,
the cohort for fiscal year 19S4 was the primary active Navy
data file used for comparison, because the SAM data was
restricted to that single year.
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2. Ready Mariner
The Ready Mariner data file is composed o-f a -Fiscal
year 1978 to fiscal year 1983 cohort of non-prior-service
accessions. This cohort file is also a longitudinal register
of all accessions for a given year, combined with the Reserve
current file for the corresponding cohort. The resultant file
provides data on 110 variables in a standard DMDC cohort
format. There were only 8,241 RMs that could be found of the
approximately 10,000 RMs that comprise this cohort. Also, the
data available from this DMDC file could not provide any
basis for a reasonable computation of RM attrition, since,
Naval Reserve records provide information for the variable
Total Active Federal Military Service (TAFMS in months) for
only 50 percent of the personnel records. CRef. 513 There-
fore, it is very difficult to determine how long one has
been in the Reserves, especially with similar inconsis-
tencies in other loss related data variables.
3. Sea/Air Mariner
The SAM data file was initiated by a list of social
security numbers (SSNs) of "known SAMs" from the inception of
the SAM program until February 1985. This list of SSr45 was
provided by the Naval Reserve Recruiting Command. These SSNs
had to be provided because DMDC was never notified of the new
SAM program and SAMs were being counted as active Navy per-
sonnel accessions- There were many irregularities in the
coding of SAMs from the present DMDC data file to develop a
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SAM cohort data file as accurate and reliable as the active
^4avy file.
The next step was to match the 11,480 SAM SSNs with the
Reserve master gain/loss file. This resulted in locating
only 9,790 of the 11,480, with only 78 losses from the
11,480 SAMs, which is less that 1 percent attrition for a
program which is over 17 months old. It is obvious that
this was erroneous. And so, a month by month match with the
current Reserve file was done to obtain attrition data,
which resulted in 10,248 matches, of which 10,176 were
supposedly from fiscal year 1984. These matches were merged
with the Military Entrance Processing Station (MEPS) file to
provide demographic data.
B. VARIABLES
Of the variables available to predict attrition within
the first six months, education level, age, and mental
category were selected because of their demonstrated signi-
ficance in other noted studies. An examination of attrition
across three countries (United Kingdom, Canada, and the
United States) and eight service components, revealed con-
sistent attrition predictability by the variables age, edu-
cation, and mental category. This relationship remained
strong despite policy differences, cultural and social dif-
ferences, and large differences of scale. CRef. 521 Initial




The objective o-f this effort is to use the stated
variables to predict six month attrition rates of non—prior-
service recruits, using the three defined data files. The
distribution of variables and their relationship to attri-
tion was determined by using Statistical Analysis System
(SAS) computer language generated data with chi square tests
for significance. Predicted attrition rates were obtained by
using a categorical logit procedure (Functions of Cate-
gorical Responses, FUNCAT) . The FUNCAT procedure of SAS
deletes any observation that has a missing value on one or
more variables. CRef.53D All individuals in the data file




A. DATA BASE SELECTION
Initial examination resulted in the conclusion that the
first year's SAM data were not worthy o-f being the founda-
tion -for a new SAM screening table. The absence o-f RM attri-
tion data left but one source to analyze for the predicted
attrition rates needed to develop a new SAM screening table,
that is the active Navy cohort file.
The active Navy file has the advantage of being consis-
tent, having a large sample size and closely representative
of the same decision of one joining the SAM program- CRef.
50D Also, the six month attrition time frame is a good
estimate of the average time a SAM has on active duty prior
to joining the SELRES unit. A prerequisite to developing a
screening table is the selection of the best data base to
use as its foundation.
The resultant demographic and actual attrition rate com-
parisons of the SAM and active Navy data files aire displayed
sequentially in Table 1. As previously stated, RM attrition
could not be computed and there is no comparative RM cohort
for fiscal year 19S4; therefore, RM data is not presented.
For information purposes, an estimated six month attrition
rate for RMs was computed to be 21 percent from a previous
CNA study. CRef. 543
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An eKamination o-f the data in Table 1 reveals some
disparities between the two data -files- To enable the SAM
program to meet its recruiting goals, a higher percentage
o-f mental category IIIBs and IVs, -females and older
recruits, were enlisted. These categories are historically
noted to produce higher attrition rates, but this is not
re-flected in the SAM data. As to education level, the active
Navy cohort has more HSGs than the SAM cohort, but this did
not appear to decrease the attrition rate as might be
e>ipected.
Furthermore, there were numerous start—up problems -for
the SAM program which were primarily caused by a sense of
urgency (which hastened the SAM program's implementation)
and the lack o-f -funding available to meet -first year costs.
These problems resulted in poor recruiter preparedness, a
shortage o-f training vacancies, and a lack o-f quality data.
There-fore, SAM attrition behavior may be di-f-ferent -from that
o-f active Navy personnel, at least -for the -first si>; month o-f
duty.
Initial analysis o-f SAM data indicated that the variables
o-f education level, =ige, and mental category where
signi -f icant. Table 2 gives the chi—square tests -for indepen-
dence -for each o-f the predictors with attrition. Race, sex,
and marital status were not -found to be si gni-f i cant
.
The demographic pro-file o-f the SAM data -file is shown in
Table 3. Education level, with only 9823 complete
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TABLE
SAM DATA DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE
Number in Each Category (Row Percent)
Variable
Variable Category Leavers Stayers Total
Education HSG 690(8.6) 8033(91.4) 8723









26(7.8) 330(92. 2) 356
207(6.6) 3156(93.,4) o>-J:"6o
162(7.8) 2082(92.,2) 2244
243(8.9) 2704(91., 1) 2947
156(14.0) 1110(86.. 0) 1266
10176
17 28(3.3) 701 (96.2) 729
18 165(7.6) 2180(92.4) 2345
19 200(8.5) 2350(91.5) 2550
20 132(9.0) 1460(91.0) 1592
21 + 269(9.9) 2691 (90. 1) 2960
10176
observations, is the variable Mith the most missing data.
Because o-f this lack of education data on 353 SAM personnel,
only the 9823 observations were used by the logit procedure
to obtain the SAM predicted attrition rates. There is very
little difference between the attrition rates of HSGs and
NHSGs, which is not consistent with the active Navy cohort
behavior. In contrast, the difference between these cate-
gories in the active Navy cohort is greater than 5 percent.
Both SAM and active Navy files were used to obtain
initial predicted attrition rates. The resultant logit models
with their respective coefficients are illustrated in Table 4
thru Table 7. Comparison of these tables reveals that the
signs of the coefficients are the same although magnitudes
differ. Some of the coefficients in the SAM model are not
significantly different from zero. This could be the result
of the relatively small SAM cohort or that these variables
truly do not discriminate between attritters and non—
attr iters. Additionally, other variables or groupings of
variables perhaps could be used to enhance the prediction
accuracy of this model. These "other" variables may or may
not be demographic. From the comparison of the regression
models in Table 4 thru Table 7, it is therefore unclear
whether relationships developed from active Navy data would
also hold for SAM personnel.
Regression analysis of the actual versus the predicted
attrition rates revealed an R—squared of . 2S3 for SAMs,
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TABLE 4
CHI -SQUARE ANALYSIS OF MAIN EFFECTS FOR THE SAM MODEL






Education Level 1 6 .0130
Mental Category 4 42 .0001
Age 4 IS .0011
Residual 39 49 . 1261
TABLE 5
LOGISTIC REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS FOR THE SAM MODEL
Variable
Variable Category Coe-f -Ficient Chi-SQ. p
Intercept -2.33 989 .0001
Education Level HSG -0.16 6 .0130
Mental Category
I 0.07 . 16 .6901
II -0.32 16 .0001
IIIA -0. 15 3 . 0662
IV 0.41 22 .0001
Age
17 -0.47 7 . 005
1
18 -0.01 .03 .8579
19 0.04 .35 . 5533
20 0. 13 2 . 1376
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TABLE 6
CHI -SQUARE ANALYSIS OF MAIN EFFECTS FOR
















LOGISTIC REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS FOR
THE ACTIVE NAVY MODEL
Variable




Education Level HSG -0.29 2741 .0001
Mental Category
I -0.44 360 .0001
II -0. 17 321 . 000
1
IIIA -0.02 4 .0469
IV 0.42 1380 .0001
Age
17 -O. 15 148 .0001
18 -0. 16 374 .0001
19 0.01 1 .2707
20 0.07 38 .0001
R-squared o-f .794 -for active Navy personnel, and a R-squared
of .156 for active Navy model in predicting SAM attrition.
This reveals Mhile that the active Navy regression model is
a good predictor of attrition for active Navy personnel , the
active Navy model does not appear to serve as a good
predictor of SAM attrition.
Further comparative analysis of the predictive value of
the SAM and active Navy models is presented in Table 3. Both
the active Navy and SAM models were applied to the SAM data
to yield predicted attrition rates for each model. These
predicted attrition rates were then crosstabulated with
actual SAM attrition rates. These tables substantiate the
greater effectiveness of the SAM model in predicting SAM
attrition. Four different cut scores were used to demonstrate
the consistency of the predictability of the SAM model. With
the aforementioned information, it was determined that even
though the SAM data file has numerous discrepancies, it is a
better predictor of SAM attrition than is the active Navy
data file. *
* NOTE: The use of data from one population (active Navy)
to predict attrition from another population (SAM) would be
expected to result in poorer predictability than that which
resulted from the SAM data itself. Even so, the active Navy
data clearly predicts SAM attrition very poorly.
TABLE 8
CRQ55TABULATI0N OF PREDICTED vs ACTUAL
ATTRITION FOR VARIOUS CUT SCORES




Leavers 760 8936 9696
PREDICTED








Leavers 465 4808 5273
PREDICTED
Stayers 329 4574 4905




















Leavers 180 1374 1554
PREDICTED
Stayers 614 8008 8622
Total 794 9382 10176
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TABLE a (continued)
CROSSTABULATION OF PREDICTED vs ACTUAL
ATTRITION FOR VARIOUS CUT SCORES




Leavers 427 4243 4670
EDICTED
Stayers 367 5139 5506




Leavers 50 335 385
PREDICTED
Stayers 744 9047 9791




















Leavers 2 12 14
PREDICTED
Stayers 792 9370 10162
Total 794 9382 10176
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B. SAM SCREENING TABLE
A review o-f the previous SAM logit model in Table 4
reveals that it can be, and should be, re-Fined be^^ore -
developing a screening table. The coe-f -f icients for mental
category I, and ages IS and older, are not significantly
different from zero. This prompted the combining of mental
categories I and II, and age categories IB—21+.
The new SAM logit model with the above groupings of
variables is presented in Table 9 and Table 10. When com-
pared to the previous SAM model in Table 4, all probabilites
were reduced, except for a slight increase for education
level. Regression analysis of the actual versus predicted
attrition rates for the new SAM logit model revealed a R—
squared of .433, which is .200 greater than the R—squared for
the previous corresponding model. All of the comparisons and
analyses indicate that the new SAM model in Table 9 and Table
10, would improve attrition predictability. Therefore, this
new model is used as the basis for the SAM screening table.
The resultant SAM screening table, based upon the
predicted attrition rates of the fiscal year 1934 SAM cohort,
is displayed in Table 11. These predicted attrition rates or
screen scores, were produced using the categorical logit
procedure. The results follow a fairly traditional pattern
with attrition rates increasing with age, and mental cat-
egory, and NHSG showing higher attrition than HSG. There are
only minor exceptions between education levels. An advantage
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TABLE 9







Education Level 1 2 .0937
Mental Category 3 42 . 000
1
Age 1 10 .0013
Residual 10 12 .2977
TABLE 10
LOGISTIC REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS FOR THE SAM SCREEN MODEL
Var iabl
e





HSG -0. 11 3 . 0937
Mental Category
I ?< II -0.28 20 . 000
IIIA -0. 14 4 . 0500
IV 0.43 34 . 000
Age





Age Mental Category HSG NHSG
I & II .035 .043





18 I S< II .065 .080
and IIIA .074 .091
OVER 1 1 IB .084 .lO:
IV .124 .149
NOTE: The above screen scores equate to predicted six month
attrition rates -for each category.
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o-f the screening table in Table 11 is that it is based upon a
cohort that is more representative o-f SAMs than a previous
screening table based on active Navy personnel, which should^
result in a more accurate prediction o-f SAM recruit attrition
behavior.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
The objective of this thesis was to develop an improved
screening table -for the Sea/Air Mariner program. In order to
develop this table, -fiscal year 1984 data -from the SAM
program was used.
Non—prior—service men and women entering the military in
Fiscal Year 1984 were -followed during their initial tour of
duty. Data on individuals available at service entry for
such variables as education level, age, mental category,
sex, race and marital status were related to attrition
occurring during the first six months of service. Statis-
tical analyses were performed to develop attrition proba-
bilities for recruits based upon these entry variables. The
resultant significant variables of education level, age, and
mental category formed the basis for the SAM screening
table. These aire the traditional attrition predictor
variabl es.
The unreliability of the Naval Reserve data files neces-
sitated a comparison of logistic regression models derived
from active Navy and SAM data files. This comparison was
made to determine which model would best predict six month
attrition for SAM recruits. The two models were compared in
terms of coefficients of determination and the
64
crosstabulations of predicted and actual attrition for both
the SAM and active Navy models. The SAM model was consis-
tently superior in its ability to predict SAM six month
attrition. In spite o-f the considerable amount o-f missing
data in the SAM data -file, the model derived -from this -file
outper -formed the model which was based on the active Navy
-file. A combining o-f categories of the SAM logit model
produced a more efficient model which was the basis for the
SAM screening table.
The SAM screening table represents an improvement over
current screening procedures. This improvement is the result
of using the Fiscal Year 1984 SAM data file as the basis for
the new SAM screening table. This data file overcomes some
shortcomings of the screening table that is presently used,
because: 1) it is more current, reflecting the present
internal and external factors which affect military attri-
tion, 2) the SAM data file predicts SAM attrition better
than active Navy data files.
The SAM screening table, with a floating cutoff score to
meet supply and demand fluctuations, would be of benefit to
recruiters. Presently, recruiters have their general
instructions but receive a deluge of messages monthly which
alter the assigned recruiting goals. Instead of referring to
the messages, the recruiter would refer to the screening
table and apply the current cutoff score, which has been
promulgated by manpower specialists.
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B- RECOMMENDATIONS
Despite the -findings of this study, there remain many
opportunities to re-fine the screening process within the
bounds of using the data presently available at recruit
entry.
This study found serious deficiencies with the SAM data
file. The necessity that manpower data be accurate and
reliable must be continually emphasized. Data should be
screened for accuracy prior to being sent to the Defense
Manpower Data Center (DMDC) and procedures established to
monitor progress for alleviating discrepancies as noted by
DMDC file managers.
Individual screening tables should be developed for
groups of ratings (or smaller divisions) since attrition
factors may differ from rating to rating. (One concern in
developing multiple tables is the increased confusion for
recruiters, who are already heavily burdened with admini-
strative standards.)
The relatively large residual value of the SAM regres-
sion model suggests that further research into other vari-
ables for inclusion could be profitable.
There needs to be a recognition of and criteria for
functional attrition. This is attrition which is desirable
to reduce those in the military who truly do not belong.
There is a direct relationship between the level of func-
tional attrition and the accuracy of the screening device
used. Since there will never be a 100 percent efficient
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screening device, there will alMays be a need for a certain
level o-f functional attrition.
In conclusion, this thesis has provided an improved
method for screening for Naval Reserve attrition. It is
clear that continued efforts to develop selection standard
models aire essential, for it is through these efforts that
the cost of recruiting and training Naval personnel can be
reduced- The resultant experienced Naval force will increase
the Navy's ability to meet the challenges of the future.
Sadly, future efforts will be hindered by poor data unless
increased quality control procedures are implemented.
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